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I examine the wage effects of Right-To-Work (RTW).  Using state-level data, I estimate 
that, ceteris paribus, RTW states have average wages that are significantly higher than 
non-RTW states.  This result is robust is across a wide variety of specifications.  An 
important distinctive of this study is that it controls for state economic conditions at the 
time states adopted RTW.  States that adopted RTW were generally poorer than other 
states.  Failure to control for these initial conditions may be the reason that previous 
studies have not identified a positive wage impact for RTW. 
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I.  Introduction 
In September 2001, Oklahoma voters made that state the nation’s twenty-second “right-
to-work” (RTW) state.  One of the most hotly contested claims in the weeks leading up to 
that election was how RTW affected wages.  RTW proponents claimed that RTW would 
increase wages in the state; opponents argued the opposite.  The conventional wisdom 
from the economics literature, typified by the following quote from Moore (1998, p. 
445), is that RTW has had little effect on wages.1 
“I review the recent literature on the determinants and effects of right-to-
work (RTW) laws.  The focus is primarily on the econometric studies 
published since the early 1980s.  Five major areas of impact are assessed: 
unionization, free riding, union organizing activities and successes in 
NLRB elections, wage structure, and state industrial development.  While 
individual findings are quite sensitive to model specification, the 
accumulated evidence indicates that RTW laws have at least a significant 
short-run impact on all of these areas except perhaps wages.” 
 
This result is somewhat surprising because previous research has identified a 
number of other effects of RTW that have been significant:  RTW has been estimated to 
significantly affect union organizing activities, plant location decisions, manufacturing 
employment, and the rate of business formation.2  Strictly speaking, the wage research is 
not inconsistent with this other research, since the theoretical impact of RTW on wages is 
ambiguous.  However, the lack of a significant impact on wages stands out from RTW 
research in other areas. 
 I use state-level data to investigate the relationship between RTW and wages.  My 
work differs from previous research in a number of respects.  Most importantly, I control 
for the influence of past economic conditions on states’ current wages.  While some 
convergence in states’ incomes has occurred (Bernat, 2001), the economic past still casts 
a long shadow on the economic present.  I show that once one controls for the influence 
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of economic conditions at the time states originally adopted RTW, a positive and 
significant impact of RTW is identified. 
 Section II provides a framework for organizing existing theoretical and empirical 
research on the consequences of RTW for wages.  Section III presents my empirical 
findings; Section IV provides explanations for reconciling my research with previous 
studies; and Section V concludes. 
II.  A Review and Synthesis of the RTW Literature Pertaining to RTW’s Effect on Wages 
A Framework for Analyzing the Overall Effect of RTW on Wages.  Although there exists a 
large literature on the general subject of RTW and wages, most of this research does not 
directly address RTW’s overall impact on wages.   
 Let the average wage in a state be given by w , 
NNUU SwSww += ,                          (1) 
where w  and S  represent the average wage and percentage share of total employment in 
the union (U) and nonunion (N) sectors.  By making use of the fact that 1SS NU =+ , it is 
straightforward to demonstrate that the effect of RTW on the average wage in a state can 
be represented by the equation, 
     ( )[ ] ( )[ ] RTWwRTWS wwRTWww SRTWw NUNUNUU ∂∂+∂∂−+∂−∂=∂∂ .       (2) 
Equation (2) decomposes the overall effect of RTW on wages into three separate 
components.  The first component, ( ) RTWww S NUU ∂−∂ , is how RTW affects the 
union wage premium.  Ceteris paribus, an increase (decrease) in the union wage premium 
results in an increase (decrease) in overall wages.  The second component, 
( ) RTWS ww UNU ∂∂− , is how RTW affects the size of the unionized sector.  Assuming 
that NU ww > , an increase (decrease) in the size of the unionized sector will, ceteris 
 3
paribus, result in an increase (decrease) in overall wages.  The last component, 
RTWwN ∂∂ , is how RTW affects wages in the nonunion sector.  Ceteris paribus, an 
increase (decrease) of wages in the nonunion sector will result in an increase (decrease) 
in overall wages. 
 Theoretical Predictions of How RTW Affects Each of the Three Components.  
RTW may encourage free riding by workers since employees can benefit from union-
negotiated wage gains without paying dues.  With fewer financial resources and a smaller 
membership, unions may be less successful in pressuring employers for increased wages.  
With respect to the union wage premium component, this reasoning predicts that 
( ) 0RTWww S NUU <∂−∂ .  On the other hand, RTW forces unions to recruit members.  
One way that unions can demonstrate their overall value to potential members is by 
securing tangible benefits, such as large wage gains.  Accordingly, some argue that RTW 
might encourage unions to be more aggressive in negotiating wage increases, so that 
( ) 0RTWww S NUU >∂−∂ .  Thus, theory is ambiguous about the sign of 
( ) RTWwwS NU U ∂−∂ .  More detailed discussions, as well as other theories, concerning 
the hypothesized effects of RTW on the union wage premium are found in Gallaway 
(1966), Bennett and Johnson (1980), Wessels (1981), Farber (1984), Moore and Newman 
(1985), Garofalo and Malhotra (1992), and Moore (1998).   
 There are several possible avenues through which RTW may affect the share of 
workers employed in the unionized sector of the economy, US .  As discussed above, 
RTW influences both the incentives and the ability of unions to negotiate benefits.  In 
turn, the size of union-associated benefits affects workers’ demand for unionized 
employment.  In addition, RTW raises the cost to unions of both gaining and keeping 
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members.  Most researchers conclude that, overall, RTW theoretically reduces the 
strength of unions and the size of the union sector.3  If RTW results in a reallocation of 
workers from the relatively high-paying union sector to the relatively low-paying 
nonunion sector, the prediction for the second component is ( ) 0RTWS ww UNU <∂∂− .  
Ceteris paribus, the result will be a decrease in the state’s average wages.  Further 
discussions of this effect, and other relevant theories, are found in Carroll (1983), Elliot 
and Huffman (1984), Farber (1984), Moore and Newman (1985), Ellwood and Fine 
(1987), Garofalo and Malhotra (1992), and Moore (1998).  
 Union activity should have “crowding in” and “threat” effects on the nonunion 
wage level, Nw .  A potential consequence of aggressive union behavior is that unionized 
firms will decrease employment which results in more workers seeking employment in 
the nonunion sector, depressing wages there (the “crowding in” effect).  To the extent 
that RTW curbs aggressive union behavior, the prediction for the third component is 
0RTWwN >∂∂ .  Others have argued that aggressive union behavior causes nonunion 
firms to raise wages in order to provide less incentive for their workers to organize (the 
“threat” effect).  If RTW caused unions to behave less aggressively, nonunion firms 
might not have the same incentive to increase wages, and 0RTWwN <∂∂ .  Another 
argument is that RTW may encourage the creation and in-migration of new businesses, 
which increases the general demand for labor, so 0RTWwN >∂∂ .  Thus, theory is 
ambiguous about the sign of RTW’s impact on the nonunion wage.  Cobb (1982), 
Schmenner (1982), Newman (1984), Neumark and Wachter (1995), and Moore (1998) 
discuss these issues in greater detail. 
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 Empirical Research Pertaining to the Effect of RTW on Wages.  Table 1 uses the 
preceding framework to relate previous empirical research to RTW’s impact on wages.  I 
identified only two studies that directly estimate the effect of RTW on a representative 
measure of average wages ( RTWw ∂∂ ).  Both Moore (1980) and Farber (1984) use 
nationally representative micro-data sets (Michigan Income Dynamics Panel and the 
Current Population Survey, respectively) to estimate the relationship between 
individuals’ wages and residence in a RTW state.  Both find negative effects, though only 
Farber’s estimate achieves significance.4 
 Far more common is the estimation of RTW’s effect on the wages of 
manufacturing production workers, represented in Table 1 by RTWw ∂∂~ .  Because these 
studies oversample the union sector and because wages in the union and nonunion sectors 
may respond differently to RTW, these studies are of limited value in determining the 
overall impact of RTW on wages.  Most of these studies estimate a negative effect for 
RTW.  Only Carroll (1983) reports a statistically significant effect.5 
 Other studies reported in Table 1 pertain to how RTW affects the three individual 
components.  With respect to how RTW affects the union wage premium, the empirical 
literature is mixed.  Only Farber (1984) reports a statistically significant effect.   
A large number of studies estimate the relationship between RTW and union 
membership.  As the quote from Moore in Table 1 states, the empirical literature 
indicates that RTW negatively affects union membership.  It bears emphasizing, 
however, that union membership is not synonymous with the number of workers in the 
unionized sector.  For example, RTW could increase the number of workers who free 
ride.  This would reduce union membership but not the number of workers receiving 
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union wages.  It is the latter element that is relevant for the overall impact of RTW on 
wages.  Thus, while the literature indicates a negative effect of RTW on union 
membership, it is unclear how to interpret this with respect to RTW’s effect on wages. 
Finally, I found only two studies that estimate RTW’s impact on nonunion wages.  
Both the Moore (1980) and Farber (1984) studies report a negative impact, though only 
Farber finds a significant effect. 
In summary, these findings generally corroborate Moore’s conclusion:  “Theory 
does not indicate how RTW laws affect wages.  The empirical evidence accumulated in 
the 1970s and 1980s indicates that RTW laws do not have strong lasting effects on 
wages.  Most researchers find that RTW laws have no impact on union wages, nonunion 
wages, or average wages in either the private or public-sector” (1998, p. 460).  My only 
qualification is that only two studies directly estimate RTW’s effect on overall wages. 
III.  Empirical Investigation of the Effect of RTW on Wages 
Sample Selection and Methodology.  I estimate the difference in current wages between 
RTW and non-RTW states, controlling for initial economic conditions that existed at the 
time of adoption.  My dependent variable is LNW2000, the log of average wages in 2000, 
defined as “Wage and Salary Disbursements by place of work” divided by “Wage and 
Salary Employment by place of work.”6 
A complication immediately arises in selecting data to measure “initial economic 
conditions.”  RTW laws were not all adopted in the same year.  Years of adoption range 
from 1944 to 2001, with 1947 being the modal year.7  I use two different years for 
determining “initial economic conditions.”  1945 is prior to the adoption of RTW by most 
of the states in the sample and thus provides a “before RTW” snapshot of economic 
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conditions.  However, 1950 is closer to the adoption dates of the RTW states used in my 
sample.8  The results using 1945 as the benchmark year are more conservative and are 
reported herein.  The 1950 results are presented in a supplementary Appendix that may 
be downloaded from the internet.9  
Wyoming (1963), Louisiana (1976), Idaho (1986) and Oklahoma (2001) adopted 
RTW significantly after 1945/1950.  I handle these states as follows:  I count Oklahoma 
as a non-RTW state because it adopted RTW after the end of the sample period.  I drop 
Idaho and Louisiana because they changed their RTW status in the middle of the sample 
period.  Wyoming is a more difficult call.  I decide to omit Wyoming from the 
subsequent analysis.10  Finally, I eliminate Alaska and Hawaii, as is common in state-
level analyses.  Accordingly, my sample consists of 45 observations: 18 RTW states and 
27 non-RTW states.11 The following preliminary results motivate the importance of 
controlling for initial economic conditions.12 
Preliminary Results.  A simple regression of the log of 2000 average wages on a 
RTW dummy variable results in the following estimated equation13: 
        LNW2000 = 3.5044 - 0.1380 RTW                                                                            (3)
                                            (-3.21)                 
 
        R2 = 0.1698,   n = 45. 
 
The RTW coefficient is large, negative, and statistically significant (the t-statistic is 
reported in parentheses below the coefficient and is based on robust (White) standard 
errors).  This simple regression has a relatively low R2 of 0.1698.  Thus, without 
controlling for the influence of other variables, RTW is negatively and significantly 
associated with lower wages. 
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 RTW states, however, are not a random sample of all states.  In particular, RTW 
states were generally poorer than other states when they adopted RTW.  Thus, at the very 
least, empirical analysis of the effect of RTW on wages should control for this “initial 
condition.”  Unfortunately, data limitations make it impossible to calculate state-level 
average wages prior to 1958.   
 My solution is to proxy average wages with Per Capital Personal Income (PCPI), 
which is available for 1945.  As evidence of the value of this proxy, I note that for years 
in which both average wages and PCPI are available, simple correlations between the two 
variables are typically about 0.90.  Accordingly, my first attempt to control for initial 
economic conditions is to add the log of the state’s PCPI in 1945 (LNP1945) to equation 
(3).  The corresponding regression results are reported below. 
        LNW2000 = 0.2458 - 0.03343 RTW + 0.4577 LNP1945                                          (4) 
                                               ( -0.80)                  (6.13)            
 
        R2 = 0.4737,   n = 45. 
 
Equation (4) yields two insights with respect to estimating RTW’s effect on 
wages.  First, it provides evidence that initial economic conditions are an important 
determinant of average wages over 50 years later.  States with higher (lower) incomes in 
1945 had higher (lower) average wages in 2000.  The relative importance of initial 
economic conditions is attested by the fact that the R2 increases from 0.1698 to 0.4737 
when LNP1945 is added.   
Second, it suggests that the negative effect of RTW reported in previous empirical 
studies may be due to the omission of initial economic conditions.  A comparison of 
equations (3) and (4) shows that the inclusion of LNP1945 causes the coefficient on the 
RTW dummy to become substantially less negative and statistically insignificant.   
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This preliminary analysis demonstrates the importance of controlling for the 
influence of states’ economic conditions at the time they adopted RTW.  The next step is 
to expand the list of control variables to account for other possible determinants of states’ 
average wages in 2000. 
Final Results.  I now consider the following control variables for possible 
inclusion in the empirical analysis: 
TEMP:  a variable that measures the state’s average annual temperature to address 
concerns that the introduction of air conditioning after 1945 may have had a 
nonrandom effect on RTW states.14 
 
 FARM1945:  a variable that measures farming’s share of total state earnings in 
1945 to address concerns that agriculture-specific demand and supply factors may 
have had a nonrandom effect on RTW states.15 
 
 MANU1945:  A variable that measures manufacturing’s share of total state 
earnings in 1945 to address concerns that factors specific to demand and supply in 
the manufacturing sector may have had a nonrandom effect on RTW states.16 
 
 DENS1945:  a variable that measures the state’s population density in 1945 to 
address concerns that the influence of rural/urban development factors may have 
disproportionately affected RTW states. 
 
 SOUTH:  a dummy variable that identifies southern (Confederacy) states. 
 EDUC1945:  a variable that measures state-level educational attainment in 1945.  
Education is widely viewed to be an important contributor to economic growth.17 
 
 RTW*LNP1945:  an “interaction” term generated by multiplying the RTW dummy 
variable by LNP1945.  This interaction allows RTW to have a different effect 
depending on whether the state was relatively poor or rich at the time it adopted 
RTW. 
 
The subsequent empirical exercise consists of identifying the best equation for 
“forecasting” a state’s average wages in 2000, given that state’s initial economic 
conditions in 1945.   
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At this point, model specification becomes a concern.  Moore et al. (1986) 
demonstrate the importance of model specification in estimating the impact of RTW.  
Accordingly, I use a computer algorithm for selecting the “best” model specifications.  
This both (i) alleviates concern that model selection is biased by my personal policy (or 
other) preferences and (ii) provides a way to confirm the robustness of my empirical 
results. 
I use both the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) and the Schwarz Information 
Criterion (SIC) to determine model specifications.  Both are widely employed in model 
selection (Grasa, 1987; Diebold, 2001).  The seven variables above, together with the 
variables RTW and LNP1945, produce a total of 511 possible variable combinations.  I 
estimate all possible variable combinations, calculate the corresponding AIC and SIC 
values, and then choose the ten best models as determined by lowest AIC/SIC value. 
Table 2 presents the empirical results.  The top half of the table identifies the 10 
model specifications with the lowest AIC values.  All ten of these models include the 
variables RTW, RTW*LNP1945, LNP1945, and FARM1945.  The other five variables, 
DENS1945, EDUC1945, MANU1945, SOUTH, and TEMP each appear in at least one of 
these models.   
The bottom half of Table 2 presents the 10 model specifications that produce the 
lowest SIC values.  There are many similarities.  The top six SIC models are identical to 
the top 6 AIC models, and follow in the same order.  However, four of the SIC models 
(the ones with the highest SIC values) omit the variables RTW and RTW*LNP1945.   
I proceed by determining the estimated effect of RTW on wages for each of these 
model specifications.  The estimated effect is calculated by  
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( )( ) 11945LNPexp 1950LNPRTWRTW −×+ *ˆˆ ββ , where LNP1945 is set equal to the mean value 
of LNP1945 for the 18 RTW states in the sample (=6.891345).  The variables RTW and 
RTW*LNP1945 are added to the four model specifications in which these variables were 
not originally included (SIC models #7, #8, #9, and #10).  For each model specification I 
also perform a Wald test of the null hypothesis that the RTW effect on wages is zero.  
These results are reported in Table 3.  
The inclusion of additional, initial economic-condition variables dramatically 
changes the estimate of RTW’s effect on wages.  In every specification, the estimated 
effect is positive and reasonably large in absolute value, ranging from 6.64 to 8.35 
percent.  Seven of the ten estimated RTW effects are significant at the 10 percent level.  
The results based on 1950 as the benchmark year are even more striking.  The 
corresponding RTW estimates range from 8.42 to 11.40 percent.18 All but one of the 
RTW effects are significant at the 10 percent level.  These results are strongly consistent 
with those of equation (4):  They suggest that the negative RTW effect estimated by 
previous studies reflects omitted variable bias caused by failing to control for economic 
conditions at the time states adopted RTW.  
The next step pursues this subject further by examining the best model--as 
determined by both the AIC and the SIC--in greater detail.  The corresponding regression 
is:    
          LNW2000 = -0.6852+ 3.0546 RTW – 0.4322 RTW* LNP1945                              (5)  
                                                 (3.58)                  (-3.58)         
                                 
                                + 0.5989 LNP1945  - 0.006804 FARM1945 ; 
                                        (5.84)                      (-5.08) 
 
          R2 = 0.7555;  AIC = 0.0082158;  n = 45. 
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          Estimated Effect = 7.93%. 
 
          Wald Test of ( ) 01945LNP H 1945LNPRTWRTW0 =×+ *: ββ : 
          =2χ 3.539047  (p-value=0.0599) 
 
          RESET Specification Test ( 32 yˆ,yˆ ):         =2χ 4.369863 (p-value=0.1125). 
          RESET Specification Test ( 432 yˆ,yˆ,yˆ ):   =2χ 6.692562 (p-value=0.0824). 
 
Equation (5) shows that an important determinant of states’ average wages in 
2000 is the size of their agricultural sector in 1945 (FARM).  Ceteris paribus, states with a 
historical dependence on agriculture have lower current wages.  This has an important 
consequence for estimates of the effect of RTW on wages.  RTW states are 
disproportionately states that have had large agricultural sectors.  Accordingly, failure to 
control for this influence will cause studies to incorrectly attribute the lower current 
wages of RTW states to their RTW status, instead of their agricultural legacy. 
Once initial economic conditions are taken into account, the model specification 
above estimates that 2000 average wages are 7.93 percent higher in RTW states 
compared to non-RTW states.  The null hypothesis that the RTW effect equals zero is 
rejected at the 10 percent level.   
A diagnostic check of equation (5) produces good news and bad news.  On the 
positive side, the associated R2 is high, with approximately 75 percent of the variance in 
states’ 2000 average wages “explained” by the model.  On the negative side, there is 
some concern that misspecification may be a problem.  One of the RESET specification 
tests rejects the null hypothesis of no misspecification at the 10 percent level. 
Because of concern with misspecification, I repeat the analysis above, replacing 
LNP1945 with the untransformed value of state PCPI in 1945 (PCPI1945).  The resulting 
sets of “Top 10” model specifications chosen by the AIC and the SIC were both (i) very 
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similar to each other (again), and (ii) very similar to the models reported in Table 2.  The 
best model--again chosen separately by both the AIC and the SIC--substitutes PCPI1945 
for LNP1945 in equation (5).  The corresponding regression results are reported in 
equation (6).  
          LNW2000 = 2.9344+ 0.4346 RTW - 0.000367RTW* PCPI1945                           (6) 
                                                 (3.64)                  (-3.78)                                         
 
 
                                + 0.000511 PCPI1945  - 0.006613 FARM1945 ; 
                                        (7.30)                            (-5.03) 
 
          R2 = 0.7641;  AIC = 0.0079277; n = 45. 
 
          Estimated Effect = 6.68%. 
 
          Wald Test of ( ) 01945PCPI H 1945PCPIRTWRTW0 =×+ *: ββ : 
          =2χ 3.000343 (p-value=0.0832) 
 
          RESET Specification Test ( 32 yˆ,yˆ ):        =2χ 2.214229 (p-value=0.3305). 
          RESET Specification Test ( 432 yˆ,yˆ,yˆ ):  =2χ 3.323023 (p-value=0.3444). 
 
The specification tests look much better.  The p-values associated with the tests of the 
“no misspecification” null hypothesis increase from 11 and 8 percent in equation (5), to 
33 and 34 percent in equation (6).   
In addition, a histogram of the residuals suggests that they are normally 
distributed.  The Jarque-Bera test of normality in the residuals produces a p-value of 39 
percent.  These results provide evidence that equation (6) is robust and not subject to 
disproportional influence from one or a few outlying observations (states).   
Equation (6) is my “final equation.”  My corresponding best estimate is that--
holding constant economic conditions in 1945--average wages in 2000 are 6.68 percent 
higher in RTW states than non-RTW states.19  This difference is significant at the 10 
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percent level.  It should also be noted that equation (6), like equation (5), estimates a 
statistically significant coefficient for the interaction variable RTW*PCPI1945 (t-value =  
-3.78).  This suggests that not all states fared equally well under RTW.  The negative sign 
of this coefficient indicates that the gain associated with being a RTW state was greatest 
for those states that were the poorest in 1945. 
The state-specific estimates of the RTW wage effects are (in descending order): 
Mississippi (22.6 percent), Arkansas (17.7 percent), South Carolina (17.1 percent), 
Alabama (15.8 percent), North Carolina (14.2 percent), Georgia (11.8 percent), 
Tennessee (10.5 percent), Virginia (8.9 percent), North Dakota (5.2 percent), Texas (4.7 
percent), South Dakota (3.6 percent), Iowa (3.4 percent), Utah (2.3 percent), Arizona (2.2 
percent), Kansas (0.7 percent), Florida (0.3 percent), Nebraska (-0.1 percent), Nevada (-
14.5 percent).20  Sixteen of the eighteen states are estimated to have higher 2000 average 
wages as a result of their RTW status.  Nevada’s negative estimated effect is due to its 
unusually large state income in 1945:  Nevada’s PCPI in 1945 was $1,611, the second 
largest value in the sample (New York had a PCPI in 1945 of $1,644).  This compares to 
an average PCPI for the RTW states of $1,007, and an average PCPI value of $1,157 for 
all the states in the sample.  The fact that all the RTW states--save two--have positive 
estimated wage effects is further evidence that these results are not driven by the peculiar 
circumstances of a small subset of observations (states). 
IV.  Reconciling with Previous Empirical Work and Addressing Potential Concerns 
My finding of a positive and statistically significant RTW effect on wages contradicts 
previous empirical research.  Section II suggests one explanation for this difference:  
Namely, that the discrepancy may be overdrawn since few studies directly estimate the 
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overall impact of RTW on wages.  To the best of my knowledge, Moore (1980) and 
Farber (1984) are the only researchers who do this.  Accordingly, they deserve a closer 
look.  Table 4 reports some relevant details. 
 Both studies use nationally representative micro-data sets from different, but near, 
time periods (1970 for Moore, 1977 for Farber).  While both studies report negative RTW 
effects on wages, Moore’s estimate of –3.71 percent is substantially less negative than 
Farber’s estimate of –6.90 percent.  Note that Moore’s study includes far greater control 
for a state’s location, occupation, and industry characteristics.  This is reflected in the 
larger R2 value of his equation.   
My empirical results suggest that as important state characteristics are included in 
the regression equation, the estimated RTW effect on wages will become less 
negative/more positive (cf. equations (3) and (4)).  The fact that Moore estimates a 
smaller negative RTW effect than Farber is consistent with this.   
Neither Moore (1980) nor Farber (1984) controls for economic conditions that 
were present at the time that RTW was adopted by the states.  Thus neither study is in 
direct conflict with my findings.  Had Moore and Farber included controls for states’ 
initial economic conditions, they too may have found that RTW laws have a positive 
effect on wages.  The same analysis applies to the other studies in Table 1 that estimate a 
RTW effect on various components of wages.   
Interestingly, the relationship between initial economic conditions and RTW 
adoption has received attention in the literature.  For example, Moore (1998, p. 449) 
notes, “Poorer states (measured in terms of economic development, wages, or income) 
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are more likely to adopt a RTW law.” Nevertheless, previous empirical work has not 
exploited this relationship with respect to estimating RTW’s effect on wages. 
 Two potential criticisms of my analysis deserve discussion: (i) the supposed 
inferiority of state-level versus individual-level data,21 and (ii) the omission of 
contemporaneous control variables.  My empirical analysis is based on a data set of 45 
observations.  Micro-based studies typically have thousands of observations--Farber 
(1984) used over 28,000 observations.22  In fact, despite their seemingly greater number 
of observations, individual-level data do not provide more information when it comes to 
analyzing differences at aggregated levels.  Neumark and Wachter (1995, p. 23) 
emphasize this point in their study of the wage effects of differences in industry-level 
characteristics:  “Certainly, because the identifying information comes from industry-
level shifts in variables … there is no added information in the individual-level data.”23  
On the dimension of information, the advantage actually lies with state-level data, since 
state-level data summarize wage information from a far larger number of observations 
than is contained in micro-based samples.  The advantage of individual-level data lies not 
in their greater number of “observations,” but that they frequently contain data on more 
variables.  This leads to a second potential concern with my research. 
 My research emphasizes the role of state initial conditions as a determinant of 
current wages.  I omit contemporaneous data on state characteristics, such as current 
values of education, demographic variables, and industry/occupational mix.  To the 
extent these variables provide additional explanatory power and are correlated with RTW 
status, my results suffer from omitted-variable bias.   
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 The fundamental issue here is the degree to which contemporaneous state 
characteristics provide additional, exogenous information beyond that contained in states’ 
initial economic conditions.  One concern driving my methodology is that changes in 
states’ characteristics may be endogenous to changes in states’ wages.  For example, 
increases in a state’s wages may lead to higher levels of education over time because 
prosperity makes education more affordable.  In addition, states with higher average 
wages may attract more educated workers from other states.  A similar migration 
argument leads to the possibility that wages may influence a state’s observed 
demographic characteristics:  Different demographic groups (e.g., the young, unmarrieds) 
may face different benefits/costs that affect their decisions to relocate and take advantage 
of more attractive earnings opportunities in other states.  Likewise, firms in different 
industries and workers in different occupations may face different benefits/costs that 
affect their willingness to migrate where labor costs are lowest or earnings are highest.  
Thus, wages may also influence a state’s observed industrial and occupational 
characteristics. 
 One advantage of my reliance on initial economic conditions is that it eliminates 
endogeneity problems.  Holding constant wages at the times that states adopted RTW (as 
proxied by state PCPI), there is no possibility that higher wages in 2000 affected state 
economic conditions in 1945.  Nevertheless, to the extent that current state characteristics 
are an additional, exogenous determinant of current state wages, there is a legitimate 
concern that my empirical results may be subject to omitted-variable bias.   
 On a related note, my research does not identify specific channels by which RTW 
may have increased wages.  Unfortunately, in this regard, existing research is also not 
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particularly helpful.  Previous studies relating RTW to the union wage premium or 
nonunion wages are limited in that they do not control for states’ initial economic 
conditions.  Furthermore, while numerous studies examine the effect of RTW on union 
membership, it is the number of workers covered by union contracts--not union 
membership--that matters for the wage effect (cf. equation (2)).  RTW may negatively 
impact union membership (by increasing free-riding behavior) without affecting the 
number of workers covered by union contracts.   
On the other hand, the fact that RTW has been positively related to plant location, 
the rate of business formation, manufacturing employment, and other dimensions of state 
economic development (Tannenwald, 1997; Moore, 1998; Holmes, 1998) is consistent 
with my finding that wages are higher in RTW states, ceteris paribus.  Clearly, further 
research is needed to identify the specific channels through which RTW affects wages. 
V.  Conclusion 
I find that after accounting for the influence of economic conditions that were present 
when states adopted Right-to-Work (RTW), RTW states have significantly higher wages 
than would otherwise be expected.  This finding is robust across a wide variety of model 
specifications.  Perhaps surprisingly, past economic conditions “explain” a large amount 
of the variation in current state wages.  For example, the addition of just two variables to 
an equation containing a RTW dummy variable--Per Capital Personal Income in 1945 
(PCPI1945) and agriculture’s share of total state earnings in 1945 (FARM1945)--along 
with an interaction term, increases the R2 of that equation from 17.0 percent to 76.4 
percent (cf. equation (3) with equation (6)).  The economic past still casts a long shadow 
on the economic present. 
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My work also shows that failure to include past state economic conditions 
substantially biases downward the estimates of RTW’s effect on wages.  I show how 
previous research on RTW’s effect on wages can be reconciled with my findings once 
this--and other factors--is taken into account.  Nevertheless, additional research 
investigating (i) the role of explanatory variables not included in this study, and (ii) the 
channels by which RTW influences wages, is needed. 
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NOTES 
 
*  I thank Kevin Grier for valuable comments and Lawrence Mishel of the Economic 
Policy Institute for constructive criticisms on an earlier version of this research. 
 
1  It is important to note that just because Right-to-Work did or did not have certain 
consequences in the past does not imply that it will have the same consequences if 
implemented in the present.  This study addresses the former subject.  It makes no 
attempt to address the latter. 
 
2  Robert Tannenwald (1997, p. 88f.) writes, “I identified 11 studies that estimate the 
impact of right-to-work laws on either plant location, the rate of business formation, 
employment, or some other manifestation of economic development…Eight of them find 
that the existence of a right-to-work law exerts a positive, statistically significant impact 
on economic activity.” 
 
3  Moore and Newman (1985, p. 575) state, “…there are good reasons to believe that 
RTW laws may have a negative effect on the extent of unionism.”  However, it is 
important to recognize that most discussions of the “extent of unionism” focus on union 
membership, which is related, but not identical, to the number of workers employed in 
the unionized sector. 
 
4  Moulton (1990) demonstrates that the use of micro-data sets to estimate the impact of 
state-level policies results in standard errors that are too small.  All of the studies in Table 
1 that employ micro-data, including the Moore and Farber studies, are subject to this 
criticism. 
 
5  Note that Moore et al. (1986) replicate Carroll’s work and demonstrate that his finding 
of significance vanishes when either (i) additional industry mix variables are included in 
the regression, or (ii) the hypothesized endogeneity of RTW is incorporated in the 
analysis. 
 
6 At the time of this writing, 2000 is the most recent year for which wage data are 
available. 
 
7  The states with RTW laws and their years of adoption are (in descending order): 
Oklahoma (2001), Idaho (1986), Louisiana (1976), Wyoming (1963), Kansas (1958), 
Utah (1955), Mississippi (1954), South Carolina (1954), Alabama (1953), Nevada 
(1951), Arizona (1947), Arkansas (1947), Georgia (1947), Iowa (1947), North Carolina 
(1947), North Dakota (1947), Tennessee (1947), Texas (1947), Virginia (1947), South 
Dakota (1946), Nebraska (1946), and Florida (1944).  The last three states had 
constitutional amendments prohibiting union shops prior to the passage of the Taft-
Hartley Act in 1947.  Sources differ slightly in their reported adoption dates.  These dates 
are taken from Newman (1984). 
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8 1950 is “closer” to the adoption years of the 18 RTW states both in terms of mean 
absolute value of the differences ( ∑ =−∑ =−
==
18
1i
i
18
1i
i 4.22181945AY    3.67,181950AY ) 
and mean sum of squares ( ( ) ( )∑ =−∑ =−
==
18
1i
2
i
18
1i
2
i 31.67181945AY    15.56,181950AY ), 
where “AY” represents “Adoption Year.” 
 
9 The Appendix is posted on my research website, located at “http://faculty-
staff.ou.edu/R/William.R.Reed-1/Papers”. 
 
10  The inclusion/omission of Wyoming has little bearing on the final results. 
 
11  Indiana adopted RTW in 1957 then repealed it in 1965.  I count that state as a non-
RTW state. 
 
12 Unless otherwise noted, all data were electronically obtained from the Bureau of 
Economic Analysis (BEA) website, www.bea.doc.gov/bea/regional/spi. 
 
13 Descriptive statistics for the variables used in this study are reported in the 
supplementary Appendix described in Note #9. 
 
14 State temperatures were electronically obtained from the Southern Regional Climate 
Center at www.srcc.lsu.edu/ccd/nrmmax.html.   
 
15  I calculate FARM1945 by dividing “Farm Earnings” in 1945 by “Total Earnings” in 
1945. 
 
16  I calculate MANU1945 by dividing “Private Earnings: Manufacturing” in 1945 by 
“Total Earnings” in 1945. 
 
17  The education attainment variable is the average of “Median School Years Completed 
by Persons 25 Years Old and Over” from the 1940 and 1950 U.S. Census (source:  
Statistical Abstract of the U.S.). 
 
18 As mentioned above, these results are more fully presented in a supplementary 
Appendix (cf. Note #9).   
 
19 Using 1950 as the benchmark year, the corresponding best estimate is that average 
wages in 2000 are 9.24 percent higher in RTW states.  The p-values associated with the 
respective hypotheses of no misspecification are 44.36 and 65.08 percent. 
 
20 The estimated RTW effect is calculated as ( )( ) 11945PCPI1945PCPIRTWRTW −×+ *ˆˆexp ββ , 
where PCPI1945 is set equal to the state-specific value and the estimated coefficient 
values are taken from Equation (6) in the text. 
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21  For example, Mishel (2001, p. 5) criticized an earlier version of my research by 
stating, “Most important, though, is that Reed bases his analysis on aggregate data for 45 
states, whereas my analysis is a representative sample of more than 150,000 workers.” 
 
22  The large number of observations in Farber’s study is primarily responsible for his 
obtaining statistically significant results where others have failed to do so. 
 
23  Moulton (1990) is also a good reference on this point. 
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Table 1 
Categorization of Previous Empirical Research on RTW and Wages 
 
 
Effect 
 
 
Study 
 
Sign of Effect (Statistical Significance) a 
RTWw ∂∂  
 
Moore (1980,Table 3,Column “Total Sample”): 
Farber (1984,Table 5,Column “All”): 
 
 
Negative (insignificant) 
Negative (significant) b 
RTWw~ ∂∂  
 
Wessels (1981,Table 1,Column “Wages”): c 
Wessels (1981,Appendix Table 1,Column “Wages”): c 
Carroll (1983,Table IV,Column (3a)): c 
Carroll (1983,Table V,Column (3)): c 
Moore et al. (1986,Table II,Column (3)): c 
Moore et al. (1986,Table II,Column (4)): c 
Garofalo and Malhotra (1992,Table 3,Column “RTW 
Effect on Price of Labor-Total Effect”): d 
 
 
Negative (insignificant) 
Negative (insignificant)  
Negative (significant) 
Negative (significant) 
Negative (insignificant) 
Positive (insignificant) 
Negative (indeterminate) 
( ) RTWww NU ∂−∂  
 
Farber (1984,Table 5,Column “All”): 
Hundley (1993,Table 5, all columns): 
Moore (1980,Table 3,Columns “Union Sample” and 
“Nonunion Sample”): 
Carroll (1983,Table IV, Columns (3) and (3a)):  
Carroll (1983,Table V, Columns (3) and (3a)): 
 
 
Positive (significant) 
Positive (insignificant) 
Positive (insignificant) e 
 
Negative (indeterminate) f 
Negative (indeterminate) f 
RTWSU ∂∂  Too many studies to list. 
 
“The available evidence suggests that RTW laws 
may reduce the extent of unionization in the long 
run by 3 to 8 percent (Moore, 1998, page 463)” g 
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Effect 
 
 
Study 
 
Sign of Effect (Statistical Significance) a 
RTWwN ∂∂  
 
Moore (1980,Table 3,Column “Nonunion Sample”): 
Farber (1984,Table 5,Column “Nonunion”): 
 
 
Negative (insignificant) 
Negative (significant) 
 
 
Notes:  (a) Statistical significance is set at the 5 percent, two-tailed level.  (b) The RTW effect enters through two variables, a RTW 
dummy variable and a RTW*Union interaction term.  The combined effect must be calculated.  Although Farber does not report a test 
of significance for the combined effect, the data in Table 5 strongly suggest that the total effect is significant.  (c) The dependent 
variable in these regressions is “log of hourly wages for production workers on manufacturing payroll.”  (d) The dependent variable in 
this regression is “the payroll of workers plus total supplemental labor costs divided by hours worked.”   (e) The union wage premium 
can be calculated as the difference between the RTW dummy variable coefficients in the “Union Sample” and “Nonunion Sample.”  
Although Moore does not report a test of the significance of the difference between these two coefficients, the data in Table 3 strongly 
suggest that the difference is insignificant.  (f) The effect of RTW on the union wage premium is inferred by the difference in the 
coefficients for the variables XPU in Column (3) and YPU in Column (3a).  The data in the respective tables are not sufficient to 
determine significance.  (g) Note that there is an important distinction between the effect of RTW on union membership, and the effect 
of RTW on the size of the union sector.  Most of the studies summarized by Moore (1985) directly address the former subject.  From 
the perspective of RTW’s effect on overall wages, it is the latter subject that is of interest. 
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Table 2 
Top 10 Models Using AIC and SIC Model Selection Criteria 
 
TOP 10 AIC MODELS 
Model Variables AIC Value 
1 (1) RTW, (2) RTW*LNP1945, (3) LNP1945, (4) FARM1945 0.0082158 
2 (1) RTW, (2) RTW*LNP1945, (3) LNP1945, (4) FARM1945, (5) EDUC1945 0.0084835 
3 (1) RTW, (2) RTW*LNP1945, (3) LNP1945, (4) FARM1945, (5) SOUTH 0.0085551 
4 (1) RTW, (2) RTW*LNP1945, (3) LNP1945, (4) FARM1945, (5) MANU1945 0.0085671   
5 (1) RTW, (2) RTW*LNP1945, (3) LNP1945, (4) FARM1945, (5) DENS1945 0.0085700   
6 (1) RTW, (2) RTW*LNP1945, (3) LNP1945, (4) FARM1945, (5) TEMP 0.0085826   
7 (1) RTW, (2) RTW*LNP1945, (3) LNP1945, (4) FARM1945, (5) EDUC1945, (6) MANU1945 0.0087976   
8 (1) RTW, (2) RTW*LNP1945, (3) LNP1945, (4) FARM1945, (5) EDUC1945, (6) SOUTH 0.0088545   
9 (1) RTW, (2) RTW*LNP1945, (3) LNP1945, (4) FARM1945, (5) EDUC1945, (6) TEMP 0.0088610  
10 (1) RTW, (2) RTW*LNP1945, (3) LNP1945, (4) FARM1945, (5) EDUC1945, (6) DENS1945 0.0088666   
   
   
TOP 10 SIC MODELS 
Model Variables SIC Value 
1 (1) RTW, (2) RTW*LNP1945, (3) LNP1945, (4) FARM1945 0.010042    
2 (1) RTW, (2) RTW*LNP1945, (3) LNP1945, (4) FARM1945, (5) EDUC1945 0.010794 
3 (1) RTW, (2) RTW*LNP1945, (3) LNP1945, (4) FARM1945, (5) SOUTH 0.010885   
4 (1) RTW, (2) RTW*LNP1945, (3) LNP1945, (4) FARM1945, (5) MANU1945 0.010901    
5 (1) RTW, (2) RTW*LNP1945, (3) LNP1945, (4) FARM1945, (5) DENS1945 0.010904 
6 (1) RTW, (2) RTW*LNP1945, (3) LNP1945, (4) FARM1945, (5) TEMP 0.010920    
7 (1) LNP1945, (2) FARM1945 0.010990 
8 (1) LNP1945, (2) FARM1945, (3) SOUTH 0.011019    
9 (1) LNP1945, (2) FARM1945, (3) EDUC1945 0.011218    
10 (1) LNP1945, (2) FARM1945, (3) EDUC1945, (4) SOUTH 0.011538 
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Table 3 
Estimated RTW Effects and Corresponding Significance Tests 
 
TOP 10 AIC MODELS 
Model Estimated Effect a 
Wald Test of ( ) 01950LNP :H 1950LNP*RTWRTW0 =×+ ββ a 
1 7.93% =2χ 3.539047  (p-value=0.0599) 
2 7.69% =2χ 3.461576  (p-value=0.0628) 
3 6.64% =2χ 1.746846  (p-value=0.1862) 
4 7.60% =2χ 2.813118  (p-value=0.0935) 
5 7.88% =2χ 3.415896  (p-value=0.0645) 
6 8.35% =2χ 3.019164  (p-value=0.0823) 
7 7.02% =2χ 2.388622  (p-value=0.1222) 
8 6.86% =2χ 2.030151  (p-value=0.1542) 
9 8.14% =2χ 2.981550  (p-value=0.0842) 
10 7.68% =2χ 3.357375  (p-value=0.0669) 
   
TOP 10 SIC MODELS 
Model Estimated Effect a 
Wald Test of ( ) 01950LNP :H 1950LNP*RTWRTW0 =×+ ββ a 
1 same as Model 1-AIC same as Model 1-AIC 
2 same as Model 2-AIC same as Model 2-AIC 
3 same as Model 3-AIC same as Model 3-AIC 
4 same as Model 4-AIC same as Model 4-AIC 
5 same as Model 5-AIC same as Model 5-AIC 
6 same as Model 6-AIC same as Model 6-AIC 
7 b,c same as Model 1-AIC same as Model 1-AIC 
8 b,d same as Model 3-AIC same as Model 3-AIC 
9 b,e same as Model 2-AIC same as Model 2-AIC 
10 b,f same as Model 8-AIC same as Model 8-AIC 
   
 
 
Notes:  (a) The RTW effect is estimated by ( )( ) 11945LNPexp 1945LNPRTWRTW −×+ *ˆˆ ββ , where 
LNP1945 is set equal to the mean value of LNP1945 for the 18 RTW states in the sample 
(=6.891345).  (b) Since the original model did not include the variables RTW and 
RTW*LNP1945, these variables were added to the equation in order to estimate and test the 
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RTW effect.  (c) The addition of the variables RTW and RTW*LNP1945 to Model 7-SIC 
produces the same variable specification as Model 1-AIC.  (d) The addition of the variables RTW 
and RTW*LNP1945 to Model 8-SIC produces the same variable specification as Model 3-AIC.  
(e) The addition of the variables RTW and RTW*LNP1945 to Model 9-SIC produces the same 
variable specification as Model 2-AIC.  (f) The addition of the variables RTW and 
RTW*LNP1945 to Model 10-SIC produces the same variable specification as Model 8-AIC. 
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Table 4 
Details of the Moore (1980) and Farber (1984) Studies 
 
Study Categories Specific Variables 
 
Location 
 
Region of Country (8 dummies), Distance Between 
Residence and SMSA (4 dummies). 
Occupation 2-Digit Census Occupation (6 dummies-including Farm). 
Industry 2-Digit Census Industry (12 dummies-including Agriculture). 
Personal 
Characteristics 
Male dummy, Marital Status (4 dummies), 
Nonwhite dummy. 
Human Capital 
Education (5 dummies), Vocational Training 
dummy, Veteran dummy, Number of Children, 
Experience (4 variables), Unemployment Rate. 
Moore (1980) 
Year = 1970 
R2 = .5566 
Effect = -3.71% 
Union/RTW Union dummy, RTW dummy. 
Location South dummy. 
Occupation Clerical, Service, and Professional/Technical dummies. 
Industry Manufacturing dummy. 
Personal 
Characteristics 
Female dummy, Married dummy, Female*Married 
dummy. 
Human Capital Education, Age, Experience. 
Farber (1984) 
Year = 1977 
R2 = .440 
Effect = -6.90% a 
Union/RTW Union dummy, RTW dummy, Union*RTW dummy. 
   
 
Note:  (a) Calculated from reported coefficients.  This estimate is the combined effect accounting 
for the Union*RTW  interaction term. 
 
